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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND BAILMENT LEASES
UNDER THE VEHICLE CODE
In Pennsylvania chattel mortgages are invalid against the claims of creditors
and purchasers in the absence of possession being taken by the mortgagee
although valid between the parties to the mortgage agreement.' This rule must
be qualified by statutory provisions validating chattel mortgages of specified
personalty without a change of possession even against creditors and purchasers2
A recent amendment to the Vehicle Code, while not specifically validating chattel
mortgages as such, would seem to have that effect within the limited scope of
3
its application.
Article II of the Vehicle Code requires the issuance of a certificate of title
for every motor vehicle owned by any resident of this Commonwealth; provides
for its contents-description of automobile, name and address of owner, statement of all liens, encumbrances or other legal claims; regulates the issuance, correction and duplication of the certificates; etc. 4 The interpretation which has
been placed upon these title provisions in the Vehicle Code is as follows, "It
was a police measure and was not designed to establish the ownership or proprietorship of the car, but rather to register the name and address of the person
having the present right of possession, and to furnish persons dealing with
one in possession of a car a means of determining whether such possession
is prima facie lawful .....
It follows that the act does not provide nor intend
to provide that the 'certificate of title' shall determine the absolute ownership of the
car, or alter or affect in any manner the actual ownership of the vehicle and
the relations of the persons interested in it ..... The certificate is not a warrant
of ownership or muniment of title as usually understood in the law. It may be
relevant evidence in establishing such title." 5
'Klaus v. Majestic Apartment House Co., 250 Pa. 194, 95 A. 451 (1915) ; Kaufmann & Baer
v. Monroe Motor Line Transportation Inc., 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 A. 296 (1936).
2Act of 1853, P.L. 295,mortgages of coal lands and mining rights in Schuylkill county; Act
of 1855, P.L. 368, leaseholds may be mortgaged in certain cases; Act of 1887, P.L. 73, and Act of
1891, P.L. 102, iron ore, pig iron, blooms, nails, crude oil, etc. may be mortgaged; Act of 1889,
P.L. 197, rental. or royalties reserved by grantors of coal or other minerals may be mortgaged; Act
of 1929, P.L. 14, mortgage on vessels; Act of 1931. P.L. 11, mortgages on crops to obtain Federal
loans tor seed, teed, etc.; Act of 1935, P.L. 38, mortgages on livestock, farm machinery, etc. toi
loans from Federal agencies; Act of 1935,'P.L. 43, mortgages on stock of cooperative associations;
and Act of 1936, Ex. Sess., P.L. 47, mortgages upon any chattels by any persons for loans from
Federal agencies. These acts may be found in 21 P.S. 831-935. The recordation provisions of the
above statutes serve to give notice of the lien to creditors and bona fide purchasers as a substitute
for a change of possession.
sAct of May 25, 1933, P.L. 1059, amending section 208. (75 P.S. 38).
4Act of 1929. P.L. 905, Art. II, Sections 201-211.
SBraham & Co. v. Steinard-Hannon Motor Co., 97 Pa. Super. 19 (1929).
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Section 208, which is contained in Article II, is captioned "Change of
Ownership by Operation of Law and Judicial Sale." It provides, in substance,
that whenever the ownership or possession of a motor vehicle passes by operation
of law or judicial sale it shall become the duty of the one from whose possession
it was taken to surrender the certificate of title to the one to whom possession has
passed and that the secretary shall issue a new certificate of title to the latter. An
amendment to this section 6 qualifies the above provision by requiring that whenever there is a first lien, encumbrance, or legal claim upon the vehicle held
by another the secretary shall deliver the certificate of title to him containing
thereon a statement of such liens, encumbrances, or legal claims. The rather
startling conclusion to the amendment reads as follows, "The certificate of title,
when issued by the secretary, showing a lien or encumbrance shall be adequate
notice to the Commonwealth, creditors, and purchasers that a lien against the
motor vehicle exists, and failure to transfer possession of the vehicle shall not
invalidate said lien or encumbrance."
The amendment further exempts the
secretary from any personal liability in carrying out the provisions of the section
or in furnishing information with respect to liens or encumbrances on
motor vehicles.
Under this amendment the filing of liens and encumbrances by their notation
on the certificate of title is adequate notice to creditors and purchasers without a
change of possession. This section of the code would thus seem to have the same
effect as a recording statute for all liens and encumbrances to which the section
applies. To give this effect to this limited class of certificates of title under the
code is incongruous in the light of the interpretation which has been placed upon
the basic title provisions set out above.
The section specifies that changes of ownership or possession by operation
of law and judicial sale occur upon inheritance, replevin, or execution sale, or a
public sale to satisfy storage or repair charges, or when repossessed upon default
of a lease, conditional gale, or other like agreement. To all such changes of
ownership or possession the section is made applicable notwithstanding it is
captioned "Change of Ownership by Operation of Law and Judicial Sale." Repossession of a car upon default of a bailment lease certainly involves no change of
ownership as property has never vested in the bailee and the change of possession is
by the act of the party and not by operation of law.
A statute altering the common law, is not to be extended beyond its obvious
import. 7 It will be highly interesting to notice what limitations, either by
force of the Constitution or by judicial interpretation, will be placed upon the
section. To date the light is not especially illuminating. In the recent case of
Kaufmann & Baer v. Motor Line Transportation, Inc.8 a writ of foreign at6Supra, note 3.
7
Strain v. Kern, 277 Pa. 209 (1923).
8124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 A. 296 (1936).
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tachment was issued against a New York corporation and two trucks were seized
in the hands of the Pennsylvania garnishee. The rights of the attaching creditor
were resisted on the ground that the trucks were sold under chattel mortgages
executed and recorded in New York where they were valid. The claimant argued
that the attaching creditor in Pennsylvania had notice of these chattel mortgages
and that therefore the general principle of their invalidity without a change of
possession should not apply. The court took the position that a chattel motgag_
without a change of possession is invalid as to creditors lvilo notice of its
existence and cited Pennsylvania authority for that proposition.9 However, even
conceding that notice would protect the mortgagee, the court concluded that sufficient notice to the attaching creditor was not shown, saying, "nor does the issuance
of a Pennsylvania certificate of title listing the encumbrances charge a creditor
with notice.... The amendment of May 25, 1933, P. L. 1059 to section 208 of
the Motor Vehicle Code referred to in the supplemental briefs, has no application here. That section relates only to changes of ownership 'by operation of
law and judicial sale'. It is sufficient to say that our Legislature has passed no
ftatute requiring or even permitting the recording of such chattel mortgages as
ire here involved and thus giving notice to all the world." (Italics supplied) It
is submitted that the language of the court as to the immateriality of notice must
be limited to cases where there has been no statutory validation of a chattel mortgage
on the subject matter in question and its correctness in this situation is doubtful.
The law abhors secret liens but a chattel mortgage where the mortgagee has assumed possession is valid because creditors and purchasers are thus put upon
notice. Chattel mortgage recording statutes are a substitute for a change of
possession thus giving notice to creditors and purchasers. In theory, notice is
the essence of a statutory chattel mortgage.
In a reclamation proceeding based on a bailment lease of an automobile
in a bankruptcy trustee's possession the amendment of 1933 was held to have
no application. 10
The amendment of 1933 may have important consequences beyond what
may be considered a chattel mortgage. A large majority of the automobiles sold
in Pennsylvania are legally "leased" under bailment lease contracts. The bailor
is protected against creditors of or purchasers from the bailee although the latter
is in possession."
However, this protection to the bailor is afforded only by a
legal bailment and not by "a mere cloak or device to secure money lent, made by
one who never owned or possessed the bailed article.''12 In the sale of and
gCorn. v. One Studebaker Coupe, 86 Pa. Super. 532 (1925).
10In re Kamens Quality Markets, 10 F. Supp. 263 (1935), reversed on other grounds in
85 F. (2d) 452 (1936).
liBrown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76 (1894); Heisley v. Economy Tool Mfg. Co., 33
Pa. Super. 218 (1907); G. M. A. C. v..Hartman, 114 Pa. Super. 545 (1934).
2
1 H. L. Braham & Co. v. Surrell, 115 Pa. Super. 365 (1934).
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loaning money on automobiles the courts will look through a screen of paper titles
to ascertain the real situation. To illustrate: A buys a car from B who is paid
with funds secured from C. C, who never had possession, leases the car to A.
Creditors of and purchasers from A are protected. 3 Where one borrows money
on an automobile and attempts to secure the loan by executing a bill of sale to the
lender, and the latter executes a bailment lease back to the owner without any
change of possession the relation between the two is merely that of debtor and
creditor. 14 Hence, creditors and purchasers of the pseudo -bailee" are protected
against claims of the "bailor."
If these attempted bailment leases are void as to purchasers and creditors
because of the failure of the bailor to have had possession,, will not the amendment of 1933 remove this protection where there has been a change of ownership
by operation of law or judicial sale? Suppose A, borrowing money on his car
transfers the title to a loan company who, in return, executes a bailment lease
to him-A remaining in possession throughout the entire transaction. Creditors
of and purchasers from A are protected. If A dies and B inherits the car for which
a new certificate is issued noting the encumbrance in favor of the loan company
the latter would seem to be protected against creditors of and purchasers from B.
There has been a change of ownership by operation of law, creditors or purchasers are charged with notice of liens or encumbrances noted on the certificate
of title, and such liens are specifically validated where there has been no
change of possession.
It is difficult to see the intent of the Legislature in placing this amendment
in the Vehicle Code. Our courts have declared chattel mortgages without a
change of possession to the mortgagee to be against the settled public policy of the
state. 15 There never has existed a crying necessity for their validation generally.
However, if it be the intent of the Legislature to express a change in that public
policy with respect to motor vehicles there can be no particular efficacy in limiting
such change to the scope of section 208. That its application will be so limited
is probable in the light of the Kaufmann case16 and the doctrine that any statute
changing the common law or the settled public policy of the state should be
strictly construed. Under all such statutes our Constitutional limitation that the
scope of their application must be gleaned from the title should be kept in mind.
A new chattel mortgage in the Vehicle Code may surprise many learned in
the profession.
The only distinction between the situations governed by the section and
those without its scope is that in the former the lien or encumbrance was not cre13Com. Banking Corp. v. Meade, 104 Pa. Super. 447 (1931);
Surrell, supra.
14Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279 Pa. 55 (1924).
15Supra, note 1.
16Supra, note 8.

H. L. Braham & Co. v.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

187

ated by the one now in possession. The reliance upon possession by creditors and
purchasers is the same in both. It is difficult to understand why creditors of one
who receives the automobile by operation of law or judicial sale should be put
upon notice of encumbrances but protected in all other situations. The question
may arise whether such classification is based on a real and substantial distinction,
bearing a reasonable and just relation to things in respect to which the classification
is imposed so that it is not violative of rights guaranteed by the 14th amendment to
the Federal Constitution.
Richard E. Kohler.

